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Abstract 
The paper examines the risk behavior of a competitive firm under price uncertainty. The mo-
del developed in the paper departs from Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a), which singly implies  
risk-averse behavior. The incorporation of more general assumptions about a firm’s fi-
nancing – access to the equity market, the possibility of a soft budget constraint – allows 
the identification of a broader range of determinants of a firm’s attitude toward risk and, 
hence, optimal output. The results indicate that price and technology are not the only impor-
tant factors in a firm’s optimal output level, as is the case for the neoclassical firm. The mo-
del also demonstrates that a firm’s net worth position, managerial sensitivity to bankruptcy, 
access to capital market, budget constraint softness, and degree of uncertainty about future 
prices may play important roles toward optimal output considerations.
1. Introduction 
In the previous decades there has been a tendency to remove the traditional 
assumption in the theory of the firm that the demand for products is known with cer-
tainty at the time when the output decision is made. The uncertain character of the en-
vironment has become a critical component in the theories of the firm. It was shown 
originally by Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972) that a firm’s attitude to bear the in-
herent risk of production has important effects on that firm’s willingness to produce. 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a) argue that a firm’s risk-averse behavior is a result of fi-
nancial market imperfections and they demonstrate its link to business cycles. The risk- 
-seeking behavior of firms resulting from too easy access to debt-financing due to soft 
budget constraint was a central policy issue in the transition economies (Kornai, Mas-
kin, Roland, 2003) and during the collapse of the banking sector in Asia in the 1990s 
(Krugman, 1998). 
However interesting they are, these models of firm behavior are components 
of the theory with the primary focus on explaining certain phenomena on the mac-
roeconomic level (business cycles, troubles of the banking sector in the transition coun-
tries, the nature of the Asian crises). They capture important patterns of a firm’s risk 
behavior, but they focus rather on the specific types of constraints or conditions of 
a firm’s financing. As a result they do not provide a complete picture of the deter-
minants of the firm’s attitude to risk. The aim of this paper is to complement this 
literature and develop a more comprehensive model of a firm, which would en-
compass a broader scope of important parameters, which may have an effect on how 
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the firm behaves – in a risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-seeking manner. The leading 
question of the paper is hence the following: What are the major determinants of 
the firm’s attitude to risk and therefore of the firm’s willingness to produce under 
uncertainty?  
The interplay between uncertainty related to the productive activity of firms 
and financing arises from a simple fact: most production takes  time and future 
markets are missing for most of the products. The cost of investment or inputs must 
be incurred before the revenue is obtained from the sale of its output. The traditional 
theory of the firm under uncertainty (Sandmo, 1971), (Coes, 1977), (Quiggin, 2001), 
(Hau, 2003) models a firm as having a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, 
which, besides other properties, is increasing and concave in its profit. The firm is 
therefore assumed to be risk-averse.
1 The principal result of this approach is the de-
monstration that (1) optimal output for a risk-averse firm facing an uncertain demand 
is lower than it would be in the case that the firm faced a certain price of the same 
expected value and (2) with riskier distribution of prices the risk-averse firm reduces 
output. However, the attitude to risk is not explained within the model and risk aver-
sion is only assumed and not specifically related to financing decisions. 
For Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990, 1993a, 1993b) capital structure is a central 
issue for the firm’s attitude to risk and the following logical framework is utilized for 
explaining behavior: financing, attitude to risk, optimal level of output. It is argued 
that as a consequence of severely limited access to the capital market due to infor-
mation asymmetries and negative signals associated with issuing equity, the reliance 
on debt-financing is the prevailing phenomenon. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a) use 
a simple model to illustrate how risk considerations affect firms’ production decisions. 
It is assumed that the firm cannot raise equity and it is financed by debt. The debt 
imposes a risk of bankruptcy on the firm and there are personal costs of bankruptcy for 
managers. Their value and reputation on the managers’ market may be harmed, be-
cause it is usually not possible to distinguish whether the bankruptcy is caused by bad 
management or adverse market conditions. Firms thus take the bankruptcy costs into 
account in their production decisions, which translates itself into lower output and high 
sensitivity of firms to any changes in the market prices. Consequently, severe business 
cycles are more likely to happen. 
Although the model of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a) lucidly relates the fi-
nancing and attitude to risk, it is very restrictive about the firm’s capital structure 
possibilities when assuming that bond-financing is the only feasible option for ad-
ditional financing. Most of the financial theorists with a similar approach to capital 
structure (e.g. (Myers, Majluf, 1984)) understand the information asymmetries as 
an explanation for conditions when a firm may refuse to issue equity and prefer debt. 
As Myers (2001, p. 81) points out: “There is no universal theory of the debt-equity 
choice, and no reason to expect one.” Or agency theory and the incentive argument 
originally suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossmann and Hart (1982) 
and Fama and Jensen (1983) provide a rationale for a mix between debt and equity as 
too much debt may imply excessive risk for managers, while too little will encourage 
1 This shift from expected profit to the expected utility of profit in the theory of the firm largely resembles 
the shift in consumer theory from the expected value to the expected utility originally suggested by Daniel 
Bernoulli almost three centuries ago via his so-called Petersburg’s Paradox. 384                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8 
misuse of funds. Therefore it is more realistic to assume that a firm is financed by 
both – by debt and by issuing new equity shares. 
The soft budget constraint (SBC) literature may add another piece to the pic-
ture as it provides a theoretical justification for, among other things, the risk-seeking 
behavior of a firm.
2 It has been shown in extensive literature that the SBC concept is 
relevant also in the economic environment based on private ownership (e.g. (Schaf-
fer, 1998), (Djankov, Murrel, 2002)). An important softening instrument in the mar-
ket economy is some form of credit. Relaxed repayment terms to banks may have 
the form of governmental guarantees (Krugman, 1998). State-owned banks may apply 
paternalistic economic policy and give firms easy access to credit even if they are in 
a troublesome financial situation. Or the banks might not require full repayment and 
they might provide refinancing for investment projects which in the first period turn 
out to be unprofitable and rely on the second period’s results to be higher than 
the costs of bankruptcy proceedings (Dewatripont, Maskin, 1995).  
As a consequence of all these forms, managers may “discount” the value of 
debt because they expect that they will not be forced to repay it in the event that 
the firm gets into financial difficulties. The ability of firms to buy inputs without 
fully repaying them can significantly alter demand for these inputs and the level of 
output produced. As pointed out in Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003) and Krugman 
(1998) the SBC induces firms towads a higher level of investment and production le-
vels by reducing the downside risk to firms.  
In the remaining part of this paper we will broaden the Greenwald and Stiglitz 
model (1993a) for the usage of equity and the possibility of the SBC and thus we will 
try to capture other important determinants of the attitude to risk and output behavior 
under uncertainty. The following model should be a generalization of the preceding 
ones. 
This paper is laid out as follows. In the next section the assumptions will be 
described and a new model constructed. Section 3 discusses the resulting firm’s sup-
ply under uncertainty. In Section 4 it will be demonstrated that changes in financing 
(net worth position, possibility to raise new equity, softness of the budget constraint) 
and the perception of risk faced by a firm can explain all types of attitudes to risk and 




A.1. We will assume that a firm can partially finance its expansion of pro-
duction through new equity shares and the remaining part through debt-financing. 
Hence
ii i
tt t TBS  , where 
i
t T  is the total level of external financing that a firm needs, 
i
t B  is the level of bond-financing and 
i
t S  is the total issuing price for new shares at 
time t.At the same time we will assume that the proportion of new equity is given by 
exogenous parameter  0;1 s¢ ²so that
ii
tt Ss T   . The parameter s represents the level 
2 For a surveying article which defines the term “soft budget constraint” and provides a comprehensive
account of contexts in which the SBC concept is relevant, see (Kornai, Maskin, Roland, 2003). Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        385
of access to the capital market. This differs from the assumption of Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1993a), who consider only a bond-financed firm and thus 0 s   .
A.2 Firms will be assumed to make decisions at discrete intervals: t = 1,…., T.
We will assume that future markets for products do not exist and that there is then 
one period lag between the use of inputs and the availability of output.  
A.3 The decision variable is the level of production 
i
t q . The output decisions of 
firms are made by managers who take into account not only profit maximization cri-
teria (relevant for owners), but also the risk connected with financing the production 
through bonds and limited predictability of future prices. As it is usually impossible 
to distinguish whether financial bankruptcy was caused by bad luck with investment 
projects or by bad management, managers inevitably suffer a stigma associated with 
bankruptcy  and  assign  personal  costs  to  bankruptcy  (Eaton,  Gersovitz,  Stiglitz, 
1986), (Greenwald, Stiglitz, 1993a).  
A.4 The technology of the firm is represented by the standard real cost func-
tion c =c (q) where q is level of production, with c´(q) > 0 and c´´(q)  0. The firm’s 
costs increase with the level of production and technology has increasing marginal 
costs.
A.5 The firm faces sectoral price level 
i
t P  , which is randomly determined around 
the overall price level. The uncertain price of output of the firm 
i
t P   is i.i.d. with 
a distribution function F(.) and density f(.). The expected price of output is assumed 
to be equal to the overall price level so that  ()
i
t EP P    . The relative prices are impor-
tant for a firm due to the fact that expenditures on inputs are assumed to be depen-
dent on the price level P, whereas the revenues from the output produced depend on 
specific sector price 
i
t P . The firm operates in a competitive market and it is a price- 
-taker.
A.6 It is assumed that if the nominal net worth position of the firm is negative 
(At < 0) the firm will go bankrupt and that all the revenues from the sale of  i
t q 1  will 
be distributed to creditors.  
A.7 All forms of the SBC with respect to a bank result in some form of partial 
or late repayment of the credit or at least they create the expectation of managers that 
the firm will have the freedom not to fully repay. In our model we will associate 
the degree to which the budget constraint related to debt is soft with the parame-
ter
i
t I . The softness of the budget constraint
3 is exogenous in our model and the value 
of the parameter 
i
t I  ranges between zero and unity,  1 ; 0 
i
t I . The parameter 
i
t I  can 





t B  represents the value of debt 
i
t B , which the firm expects that it will be 
forced to repay.  
3 It is assumed that the degree of softness of the budget constraint is firm specific (e.g. the firm is “too
big to fail” or it has strategic importance for the state or financing institution) rather than a feature of
the given economic environment. Therefore the notation is and not, although both are possible de-
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The decrease in 
i
t I  will simulate the increase in the degree of softness of the bud-
get constraint. Under standard market conditions 
i
t I is equal to one and the more 
moral  hazard  there  is  in  the firm’s  decision-making  due  to  the SBC,  the closer 
the parameter 
i
t I  will be to zero.  
As the net worth position is dependent on the level of debt which the firm has 
to  repay  (see  the equation  (1)  below),  the lower 
i
t I  m ay  artificially  keep  the net 
worth positive and the company will not go into bankruptcy. The A.5 therefore still 
holds, even though under standard market conditions (
i
t I  = 1) the firm would go 
bankrupt.  
A.8 For the sake of simplicity we assume that the overall price level does not 
change  between  the periods  Pt=Pt +1 a nd  we  will  denote  the price  level  P as  in-
dependent of time. The only source of risk is thus the uncertain price of output 
i
t P  .
A.9 We assume that output  1
i
t q   has zero supply elasticity and must be sold in 
its entirety at the beginning of the following period t, when it becomes available. 
2.2 Bankruptcy Conditions 
The nominal net worth position 
i
t A  is defined as all assets minus all liabilities. 
It determines the solvency of a firm and it results from the production and financing 
decisions made in period t–1.  
11 1 (1 )
ii i i i i
tt t tt t A Pq r B I              (1) 
The nominal level of debt  1
i
t B   was utilized to pay for the inputs that were re-
quired for producing  1
i
t q  . The contractual interest rate of debt is  1
i
t r  , the contractual 
repayment owed to debt-holders is  11 (1 )
ii
tt rB    and the degree to which the budget 
constraint is soft is 
i
t I . The nominal net worth position is also affected by the price 
i
t P at which the firm sells the inherited output  1
i
t q  .
The level of external financing 
i
t T  needed for production in period t depends 
on the difference between the level of costs and net worth position. Since the cost 
function is defined in real terms we can write 
()
ii i
tt t TP c qA           (2) 
The firm has two options for supplementing its own resources (net worth) in 
financing the production: through debt 
i
t B  or through issuing new equity
i
t S . As noted 
earlier in A.1, the proportion of new shares in total external financing (and thus of 
bonds) is given by the parameter s.
In the second stage, after the prices in period t+1 are revealed, the firm will go 
bankrupt if it is obliged repay more than its income allows it to repay. Using as-
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         1 (1 )
ii ii i
tt tt t Pq rB I             (3) 
By rewriting and using A.1, A.5 and equation (2) we get the same condition as: 
1 (1 ) ( ( ) )
ii ii i i i
tt tt t t t Pq rIP c q A S            (4) 
Dividing the equation by 
i
t q  we get: 
          11
(1 ) ( ( ) )
ii i i i
ii tt t t t
tt i
t





          (5) 
where  1
i
t P  is the lowest sectoral price in period t+1 at which the firm is solvent and 
it shows the extent of changes of relative prices the company is able to absorb with-
out becoming bankrupt. The company is more resistant to bankruptcy risk (i.e. it has 
lower  1
i
t P ) with an increase of its net worth position and the level of new shares is-
sued in period t, and a decrease in 
i
t I  and decrease in the contractual interest rate. 
2.3 Probability of Bankruptcy 
A.10 We assume that firms can borrow as much as they wish as long as 
the lender gets the expected return amounting to  1
f
t r  , where 
f
t r  is the risk-free 
interest rate. The lender takes into account not only the regular repayments amount-
ing to 1
i
t r   in the situations when a firm is solvent – if  11
ii
tt PP  t   –, but also a return 
, 1
iB T
t r   when a firm is insolvent – if  11
ii
tt PP    .
Therefore the contractual interest rate is given by the following equation: 
                
,
11 1( 1 ) ( 1 ( ) ) ( ) ( 1)
fi i i i B T
tt t t t rr F P FP r                    (6) 
where F(.) is the probability distribution of the sectoral price and  1 ()
i
t F P  is defined 
as the probability of bankruptcy. The individual firm pays via its contractual interest 
rate not only the opportunity costs (risk-free interest rate), but it also pays to the lend-
er for the risk that the firm will go into bankruptcy and that the bondholder will get 
only the return (
, 1
iB T
t r  ), where 
, 1;
iB T i
tt rr   ! . As a consequence, the contractual 
interest rate is higher than, and increases with, the risk-free interest rate, increasing 
with the probability of bankruptcy and decreasing with the amount the lender can get 




Theprobability of bankruptcy 1 () ( ( , , , , ) )
ii i i i f
tt t t t t F PF P q A S I r    is positively de-
pendent on  1
i
t P , which causes it to increase along with the increase of the interest 
rate and decrease with the initial net worth position, the amount of new shares and 
softness of the budget constraint.  
4 The model could be further extended by making the 
, iB T
t r dependent on other parameters such as random
price, level of debt and output level. This extension would not alter the main results of the model and for
the sake of simplicity it is thus assumed that 
, iB T
t r  is a constant. 388                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8 
The shape of the distribution function F(.) expresses the degree of uncertainty 
concerning future prices. The relationship between these parameters and probability 
of bankruptcy can be easily graphically illustrated. On the horizontal axis is the un-
certain sectoral price  1
i
t P   and on the vertical axis we plot:  
– the firm’s gross margin defined as  1 ()
ii i
gmt t t Pq P c q S    ,
– the return of owners defined as 1 ()
ii i i i
owners t t t t t Pq P c q r B S     , if  11
ii
tt PP  t 
(the firm is solvent) or as 
ii
owners t t A S S    , if  11
ii
tt PP     (the firm is bankrupt), 
– the return to bondholders defined as 
ii
debtor t t rB S   , if  11
ii
tt PP  t  or as 
1 ()
ii i i i
debtor t t t t t Pq P c q A S S      , if  11
ii
tt PP   
.
In the upper part of Figure 1 we have plotted the probability density f(.) of 
the sectoral price, which illustrates the uncertainty.
5 The area under the density func-
tion up to the solvency price  1
i
t P  measures the probability of bankruptcy  1 ()
i
t F P .
For illustrative purposes, let’s take a look at the effect of new shares and increased 
uncertainty for a given 
i
t q .
An increase of new shares 
i
t S  has two effects. It increases the owner’s liabi-
lities and it works as a substitute for bond-financing, which is reduced. Consequently, 
the contractual interest rate and thus repayments to debtors decrease for all levels of 
relative prices –  debtor S  shifts down,  owners S  shifts to the left. Both effects lead to a de-
crease of the probability of bankruptcy. 
The shape of density function f(.) also influences the size of the area illus-
trating the probability of bankruptcy 1 ()
i
t F P . Let us define an increase in price uncer-
tainty as a “stretching” of the probability distribution around a constant mean (Sand- 
FIGURE 1 The Effect of New Shares on the Probability of Bankruptcy 
5 The distribution function of output prices is assumed to have a shape similar to normal distribution with
the mean equal to the overall price level, the lower boundary equal to zero and the upper boundary equal to 
double the price level. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        389
mo, 1971). In Figure 2 the probability function g(.) corresponds to the riskier dis-
tribution of prices. We can observe opposite effects of uncertainty depending on 
the firm’s financial situation. If the solvency level of the output price is lower than 
the overall price level, then riskier distribution increases the probability of bank-
ruptcy –  () () F PG P  . In other words, if it is more probable that the firm will sur-
vive than that it will go bankrupt, then price uncertainty is a bad thing from the per-
spective of the firm’s survival. In the opposite situation, when  ' P  is very high and 
the firm has a poor chance for survival, the increase in price uncertainty may help 
the firm  out  of  trouble  via  the increased  probability  of  extremely  high  prices. 
The probability of bankruptcy thus decreases for riskier distribution of prices – 
() () F PG P ! .
2.4 The Firm’s Objective Function and First Order Conditions 
We focus on a firm with divided ownership and control and therefore consider 
managers as the primary decision-makers in the firm. The managers select the output 
level so as to maximize expected profit of the operational firm (i.e., total sales reve-
nues minus repayments to lenders and opportunity costs of new equity capital) minus 
their personal costs of possible bankruptcy. 
The objective function with these features can be expressed in the following 
way: 
             
,
11 0 [( 1 ) ( 1 )( ) ]
iE i i i i f i i i
tt t t t tt t t q MAX P q r I B r S K F P  t           (7) 
In compliance with Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a) the bankruptcy costs are de-
fined as the costs of bankruptcy 
i
t K multiplied by the probability of bankruptcy. Bank-
ruptcy costs represent the negative attitude of managers towards bankruptcy. They 
are subject to an agency agreement that rewards them with a share of profits, but they 
have to bear a large penalty in the event of bankruptcy (stigma of an unsuccessful 
manager). 
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A.11 We assume that the bankruptcy costs increase with the size of the firm. 
The bigger the firm is, the more managers (and employees) are involved, whose loss 
of position and income would increase with the firm’s size. We will use quantity as 
the proxy variable for the firm’s size as it is the only scale variable in the model and 
thus the bankruptcy costs are defined as follows:  
ii
tt K Kq             (8) 
The bankruptcy costs are linearly related to the firm’s level of production, 
where K is the sensitivity of managers to bankruptcy.
6
We can rewrite the objective function as: 
,
1 1 0 [( 1 ) ( ( ) ) ( 1 ) ( ) ]
iE i i i i i i f i i i
tt t t t t t tt t t q MAX P q r I Pc q AS r SK q F P   t              (9) 
If the above-stated assumptions are fulfilled, then the firm’s behavior in terms 
of its real output is determined by interest rates, softness of the budget constraint, 
technology, the firm’s ability to issue new shares, equity, real bankruptcy costs and 
relative price uncertainty. 
After derivation of equation (9) according to q we get the first order equili-
brium condition 
          
,*
1 (1 ) '( ) (1 ) 0
ii
iE i i i f i tt
tt t t t t ii
tt
TT




      ¨¸
ww ©¹
     (10) 
where 
i
t K is the marginal bankruptcy costs of firm i in period t:




ii i i t
tt t t i
t
P








       (11) 
(,, ,,,)
ii i i i i
tt t t t t K qASIr KK    can be understood as risk premium for additional produc-
tion. 
3. The Firm‘s Supply under Uncertainty 
The equilibrium condition (12) below is the central outcome of our model. At 
first we will try to show that the resulting behavior is a generalization of the existing 
concepts of a firm under uncertainty. Consequently we will perform a sensitivity ana-
lysis of the optimal output on the major parameters. This exercise will allow us to 
devise nine propositions about the determinants of the firm’s attitude to risk and 
the impact on the firm’s behavior.   











 w e  can  rewrite  the equili-
brium condition (11) so that:  
     
,*
1 '( )[(1 ) (1 ) (1 )]
iE i i i f i
tt t t t t PP c q s Ir s rK              (12) 
The output is selected so as to equalize price on one hand and on the other 
6 Besides this reasoning, the dependence of bankruptcy costs on the size of a firm is important from
the technical point of view of this model as with bankruptcy costs having been fixed, they could be easily
mitigated through expansion of production. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        391
hand (1) marginal costs that include the costs of financing weighted for the relative 
proportion of new shares and debt and (2) the personal bankruptcy costs. 
The first question which is naturally raised by the introduction of price uncer-
tainty and financing issues is how the optimal output compares with the well-known 
neoclassical solution. The traditional neoclassical analysis says that a firm maximizes 
its profit and therefore that firm produces up to the point when the market price is 
equal to the present value of the marginal costs. In terms of our model it is the situa-
tion when:  
– the firm faces a hard budget constraint ( 1
i
t I   ) and  
– the costs of production expansion can be fully financed through new shares 
( 1 s   ).
As the event of bankruptcy is possible only when the company is at least par-
tially financed by debt, the risk premium 
i
t K is equal to zero. We can then write:  
        
,*
1 '( )(1 )
iE i f
tt t PP c q r           (13) 
This outcome is the traditional neoclassical result taking into account the fact 
that the costs are paid one period before the output is received and opportunity costs 
must be included. 
The second situation of interest is when a firm faces a hard budget constraint 
(HBC, 1
i
t I   ) and it is partly financed through debt. The managers choose the level 
of output according to the following equation: 
     
,*
1 '( )[(1 )(1 ) (1 )]
iE i i f i
tt t t t PP c q sr s rK              (14) 
Thecostsofdebt
i
t r and theopportunity costs of new shares
f
t r are weighted ac-
cording to their relative proportion to give the total costs of financing. As the con-
tractual interest rate related to debt is higher than the risk-free interest rate (equa-
tion 6), better access to the capital market approximated by the exogenous parame-
ter s reduces the costs of financing. It is interesting to notice that to the extent a firm 
can issue new shares on the capital market (sĺ1) in order to finance its additional 
production, the marginal costs of production and financing move towards the level of 
marginal costs related to a traditional risk-neutral firm as we have shown above.  
The item 
i
t K is another departure from the traditional risk-neutral neoclassical 
equilibrium. The bond-financed or co-financed firm has to face the risk of bank-
ruptcy. As a consequence, the marginal bankruptcy costs 
i
t K (risk premium) are po-
sitive. The impact of bankruptcy risk is thus a restriction of the optimal output level.  
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a) model a situation when a firm is solely bond- 
-financed ( 0 s   ), faces an HBC and pays a higher contractual interest rate for the over-
all financial needs
ii
tt TB   . At the same time the risk premium with solely bond-fi-
nancing is the maximum of the risk premiums associated with co-financing (bonds 
and new shares). Both of these effects lead to a firm having the highest possible risk 
aversion and lowest optimal level of output (supply curve 
i
B S in Figure 3) compared 
to our model. Here, new shares work as a buffer to absorb risks. The more the firm 392                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8 
has access to equity financing, the less risk-averse it will be and the supply curve will 
shift to the right towards the supply curve associated with a risk-neutral firm.  
Let’s look at the behavior of a firm which faces an SBC, in which case the pro-
bability of fully repaying its debt obligations is lower than unity ( 1
i
t I  ). So far we 
have assumed it is desirable for managers to search for funding on the capital mar-













, it is preferable for managers to finance production completely via loans, 
because doing so reduces the costs of financing. Managers also feel less threatened 
by the firm’s debt obligations and thus the bankruptcy risk premium associated with 
bonds decreases with the softness of the budget constraint. 
We can rewrite the equation (12) so that: 
,*
1 '( ) (1 )
iE i i i i
tt t t t PP c q Ir K            (15) 
The softer the budget constraint is, the more the costs of production are “dis-
counted” and the closer the bankruptcy premium is to zero. In an extreme case, when 
the firm has certainty that it will not have to repay its debt ( 0
i
t I   ), the managers do 
not include the costs into their considerations about optimal output. Consequently, 
the supply curve of a firm facing an SBC ( ,1
i
B I S  ) is shifted to the right and the op-




BI q  ) may become even higher than for a neoclassical 
risk-neutral firm. Figure 3 graphically illustrates the three situations discussed above. 
i
B S is the supply curve of a firm as understood by Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1993a). It is only bond-financed, very risk-averse and produces low levels of output. 
The inclusion of the possibility of equity financing creates a continuous interval for 
the firm’s supply curve with the upper extreme being a neoclassical risk-neutral firm. 
The introduction of the SBC has further broadened the model for risk-seeking be-
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havior. The managers may put greater weight on the favorable development of prices 
because they are not so motivated to reduce the chance of failure and, as a result, 
the firm produces more even relative to the risk-neutral producer. When the degree 
of softness 
i
t I  is switched for unity due to, for example, privatization of state banks, 
the optimization issue changes rapidly. The firm starts to face an HBC and it may 
cause substantial shrinkage in the firm’s supply.  
4. The Determinants of Firm’s Attitude to Risk and Optimal Output 
In this section we will elaborate algebraically how the major parameters influ-
ence the firm’s attitude to risk and its optimal output.  
4.1 Net Worth Position, the Interest Rate and Sensitivity to Bankruptcy 
By differentiating the optimality condition (12) according to the net worth po-
sition we get: 
       
*
** (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ''( ) '( )(1 )
ii i
ii f i i i tt t
tt t t t t ii i
tt t
qr
sI r s r P c q P c q sI
A AA
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      (16) 
The  first  item  on  the right-hand s i d e  r e presents  the change  in  costs  of  fi-
nancing due  to  the change  in  net worth. The contractual  interest  rate  required  by 
banks is negatively dependent on the net worth position and the proportion of debt on 
the value of marginal costs is non-negative, and thus the whole first item is positive. 
The second item on the right-hand side is also positive as the change in the risk pre-
mium associated with bankruptcy is negatively dependent on the net worth position, 
because a stronger net worth position decreases the probability of bankruptcy. Since 
we assume that marginal costs increase with quantity, we can conclude that the op-













Result 1: Under price uncertainty stronger net worth position decreases the costs of 
production financing, decreases risk premium associated with bankruptcy and there-
fore increases the optimal level of production.
The lower boundary of the contractual interest rate is the risk-free interest rate 
and the minimum risk premium is zero. There is thus a level of 
i
t A  above which the de-
crease of the interest rate and bankruptcy premium due to the increase in 
i
t A  will be 
close to zero. 
Result 2: There is certain level of net worth above which the impact of increased net 
worth has an insignificant positive impact on the optimal level of production.
The positive relationship between net worth and the level of production is de-
termined also in (Greenwald, Stiglitz, 1990, 1993a). Using the differentiating exer-
cise  with  respect  to  the  risk-free  interest  rate  and  the  sensitivity  of  managers  to 
bankruptcy K we can obtain two more results which are also very similar to those of 
the Greenwald and Stiglitz model. 
Result 3: Under price uncertainty the increase of the risk-free interest rate increases 
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therefore decreases the optimal level of production. Moreover, the optimal output de-
creases faster than that of a risk-neutral firm.
Result 4: Under price uncertainty the increase of the sensitivity of managers to bank-
ruptcy increases the risk premium associated with bankruptcy and therefore decrea-
ses the optimal level of production. 
The results that follow are products of additional features of our model. 
4.2 New Shares and Optimal Output 
The effect of new shares resembles the situation for the net worth position with 
one exception. The equation (17) shows that  the negative relationship between new 
shares and costs of financing is conditional on the existence of and HBC. In the case 
that an SBC is present, the effect of increased s is ambiguous. On one hand, the interest 
rate required from lenders decreases up to risk-free interest rate. On the other hand, if 
a firm faces an SBC it may be cheaper to rely on loans, because they may not be fully 
repaid. In such a situation we cannot determine a sign of a change in the costs of fi-
nancing. In any case, the risk premium decreases with the level of new shares. Thus, for 
a firm that faces an HBC the optimal level of production is positively dependent on 
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Result 5: Under price uncertainty and the existence of a hard budget constraint, the in-
crease in financing through new shares decreases the costs of financing and decrea-
ses the risk premium associated with bankruptcy, and therefore increases the optimal 
level of production. 
Figure 4 illustrates these relationships and the independence of output from fi- 
nancing  in  the theory  of  a risk-neutral  firm  (
*
rn q  )  and  the traditional  theory  of 
a firm under uncertainty (
*
ra q   (Sandmo, 1971)). In our model the optimal output 
*
m q
increases up to the level of production associated with a risk-neutral firm for 1 s   .
We  can e a s i l y  observe  that  if  we  take  the extreme  case  used  in  the models  of 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, where  0 s   , the level of production under uncertainty will 
be the lowest possible.  
4.3 Price Uncertainty and Optimal Output 
The determinants we have analyzed so far influence first the minimal sectoral 
price level when a firm is solvent 
i
t P  and then through the probability of bankruptcy 
()
i
t F P they change the contractual interest rate and the risk premium. This time we 
keep the solvency level of the sectoral price constant and we model the impact of 
the changes in the variance of the distribution function F(.).
It is not straightforward how the effect of increased variance can be forma-
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risk behavior for other parameters. Let’s define the subsidiary function  (, )
i
t XPV ,
which represents the distribution function for different levels of 
i
t P  and different le-
vels of uncertainty represented by ı. We can imagine the departure from  ()
i
t F P to 
(, )
i
t XPV  as adding another dimension ı, where the probability of bankruptcy de-
pends not only on the solvency level of price 
i
t P as is the case for ()
i
t F P , but also on 
its variance. Therefore, (, ) ()
ii
tt X PF P V   , if the “variable” variance in the subsidiary 
probability of bankruptcy is the same as the given variance behind our original pro-
bability of bankruptcy. 
Let’s substitute the originally utilized probability of bankruptcy with the sub-
sidiary one and let’s differentiate the optimality condition according to variance. We 
get: 
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We have already analyzed the relationship between increased uncertainty and 
the probability of bankruptcy in Section 3 (Figure 2). There is a positive relationship 








) if the firm’s 
solvency price is lower than the overall price level ( i
t PP  ). A negative relationship 
is present if
i
t PP ! , because its probability of survival
7 is low and a big variance of 
prices may help the firm out of trouble. 
























FIGURE 4  New Shares and Optimal Output 
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 depends on 
the financial situation of the firm. 
Result 7: If the probability of bankruptcy is lower than the probability of the firm’s 
survival, then the increase in the price uncertainty increases the costs of financing 
and the risk premium associated with bankruptcy and therefore decreases the opti-
mal level of production.  
Result 8: If the probability of bankruptcy is higher than the probability of the firm’s 
survival, then the increase in the price uncertainty increases the optimal level of pro-
duction. 
In other words, under normal circumstances, if a firm may go bankrupt only in 
the case of extremely adverse market conditions (low prices), the increased price un-
certainty induces the firm to reduce its output level. On the other hand, if the firm has 
financial troubles, then the managers may welcome the increased uncertainty of its 
output prices and increase the optimal output in order to increase the chance that 
the firm will get of trouble. In such a situation the managers have an incentive to 
gamble their way out of the coming insolvency through risky investments and risky 
levels of production. (Figure 5)
Traditional theories of the firm under price uncertainty demonstrate a decline in 
production 
*
ra q   due to uncertainty. The Greenwald and Stiglitz model (1993a) deter-
mines a negative relationship between the degree of uncertainty and the optimal output 
as well. However, in other places Stiglitz (1994) highlights the incentives of insolvent 
banks to make high-risk loans in order to avoid insolvency and uses the similar logic 
we explained for the case of our firm. This phenomenon is theoretically explained also 
in a number of other places. For example, Hlaváþek (1999, pp. 106–110) uses his 
model of a firm which maximizes the probability of its survival instead of profit, and he 
argues that there are situations which force the firm to behave in a risk-seeking manner 
even though normally the firm would behave in a risk-averse manner. The immediate 
threat of a firm’s liquidation is taken as an example of such a situation.  
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4.4 SBC and Output Behavior 
As the final parameter we will analyze the impact of an SBC. There are two ef-
fects similar to the preceding variables: the change in financing costs and the change in 
the risk premium. These two effects will push a firm to the level of production of 
a risk-neutral firm (similarly as new shares and net worth position). In addition, in 
an SBC environment managers “discount” the value of costs financed by debt. This 
effect is represented by the third item on the right-hand side, which is constantly ne-
gative. This third effect can push a firm into production levels even higher than those 
of a risk-neutral firm and ex-post this production expansion can be considered as ex-
cessively risky. All three effects lead to a negative relationship between the hardness 
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Result 9: Under price uncertainty, an increase in the softness of the budget constraint 
decreases the costs of financing, decreases the risk premium associated with bank-
ruptcy and discounts the value of debt perceived by managers, and therefore increa-
ses the optimal level of production. 
The increase in optimal output 
*
m q  with the softness of the budget constraint is 
faster below the level of production of a risk-neutral firm, because all three effects 
are present. Above 
*
rn q   the output 
*
m q  grows at a slower pace as only the third effect 
(managers discounting production costs financed by debt) is at work.  
5. Conclusions 
The attitude to risk directly influences a firm’s willingness to produce in the en-
vironment of uncertainty. The presence of uncertainty thus changes many of the pre-
dictions of the neoclassical theory of the firm under certainty, where the only im-
portant determinants of the firm’s optimal output are technology and relative prices. 
This paper aimed to answer the following question: What are the major determinants 
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of the firm’s attitude to risk and therefore of the firm’s willingness to produce under 
uncertainty? In doing so, we have used the following logical framework: financing, 
attitude to risk and optimal output. A model of a firm has been developed, where 
the managers are the primary decision-makers and include personal costs of bank-
ruptcy into the profit maximization as originally suggested by Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1993a).  
Unique to our model is more general approach to the firm’s financing pos-
sibilities and conditions. Our firm is not restricted to only debt-financing as is as-
sumed in the otherwise-very-inspiring model of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a), 
which implies risk-averse behavior of a firm and a lower optimal output level. We 
have incorporated other plausible assumptions about a firm’s financing, most im-
portantly partial access to the equity market and the possible existence of the soft 
budget constraint related to debt-financing. The model thus provides comprehen-
sive endogeneisation of the firm’s attitude to risk, which ranges from strongly risk- 
-averse behavior to risk-seeking behavior and which to my knowledge is not pre-
sent in the existing literature. It has been shown that from the perspective of our 
core question the benchmark models can be understood as special cases in relation 
to this model (see Table 1). 
Nine propositions about the determinants of the firm’s behavior under uncer-
tainty were devised. Of these, the following considerations are perhaps the most inte-
resting ones. Firstly, firms with a stronger net worth position and with more ready 
access to the equity market will tend to produce more, other things being equal. 
The impact of these parameters decreases with their absolute value with the maxi-
mum being at the level associated with the traditional risk-neutral firm. Secondly, 
the price uncertainty has a dual effect depending on the financial condition of the given 
firm. Under normal circumstances, when the probability of bankruptcy is relatively 
low, an increase in the price uncertainty will lead to a reduction of output. On the other 
hand, a firm teetering on the edge of bankruptcy will be tempted by the increased 
uncertainty towards higher levels of production. Thirdly, the soft budget constraint 
leads to excessively risky behavior and to the expansion of output. The optimal out-
put of the firm facing a soft budget constraint may even go beyond the neoclassical 
optimal output level.  
TABLE 1  Summary of the Theories of Firm under Uncertainty 
Financing  Attitude to risk  Output behavior 
Neoclassical firm  Ø A: certainty   
A’: risk neutral   P: 
* () rn pM C q   
Traditional theory of 
firm under uncertainty  Ø A: risk averse   P: 
**
ra rn qq  
Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1993a) 
A: B>0 
     S=0  P: risk averse   P: 
**
B rn qq  
Soft budget constraint 
concepts 
A: B>0 
           SBC 
P: risk seeking   P: 
**
rn S B C qq  
This model 
A: B>0 
     S>0 
          SBC
P: risk averse 
    risk neutral 
    risk seeking 
 P: 
** * ; mB S B C qq q  !
Note: We denote the assumptions as “A” and the results of the models as “P” (propositions). Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        399
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